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discharged from their employment, we cannot concur in the
view that plaintiffs are entitled to recover the compensation
specified in the contract of employment. When an attorney
employed under a contingent fee contract is discharged without cause, he should be entitled to recover the reasonable value
of the services performed by him prior to his discharge. (See
concurring opinion in Salopek v. Sckoemann, 20 Cal.2d 150,
156 [124 P.2d 21]; Oole v. Myer.s, 128 Conn. 223 [21 A.2d
396, 136 A.L.R. 226] ; Hubbard v. Goffinett, 253 Ky.. 779 [70
S.W.2d 671] ; Pye v. Diebold, 204 Minn. 319 [283 N.W. 487] ;
Martin v. Oamp, 219 N.Y. 170 [14 N.E. 46, L.R.A. 1917F
402] ; Oa'IJers v. Old Nat. Bank & Union Trust 00., i66 Wash.
449 [7 P.2d 23] ; see also cases in 136 A.t.R. 254.) He should
not be permitted to recover the fee fixed in the contract,
however, for the reasons stated in the concurring opinion in
Salopek v. Sckoemann, supra. The present case was tried and
submitted to the jury upon the theory that the proper measure
of damages for breach of an employment contract of this nature
is the compensation fixed by the terms of the contract. In our
opinion, there should be a retrial ofthe issue of damages for that
reason. While it is true that the verdict does not award' plaintiffs a sum commensurate with that provided for in the contract,
it is impossible to determine how the jury arrived at its verdict
in view of the theory upon which the case was tried.
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Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied September 1, 1943. Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J.,
voted for a rehearing.
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[3] Id.-Compensable Injuries-Arising Out of Employment.-In

[4]

[5]

'

[L. A. No. 18601. In Bank. Aug. 3, 1943.]
[6]

[1] Workmen's Compensation-Compensable Injuries-Acts Per-

sonal to Employee-Acts Off Employer's Premises.-Acts of an
[1J See 27 Cal.Jur. 359.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Workmen's Compensation, § 86; [2]
Workmen's Compensation, § 99; [3] Workmen's Compensation,
§72; [4,5,7] Workmen's Compensation, §219; [6] Workmen's
Compensation, § 212.
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employee for his personal convenience, comfort or wellare do
not necessarily take him out ·of the course of his employment,
even though done away from the employer's premises.
[2] Id.-Compensable Injuries-Going to and Coming from Work
-Acts for Mutual Benefit of Employer and Employee.-A.
fatal injury sustained by a drilling superintendent while on
.his way home to inform his wife that he would. work at the
. oil well throughout the night occurred in and arose out of tho
course of the employment, where, the. superintendent had no
regular hours and exercised considerable discretion in the pe~
formance of his duties, where he transacted some of his employer's business from his home and used his telephone there
for that purpose, where on this occasion his employer, although
suggesting that he telephone his wife from the office, did .not
forbid him to return home, and where several witnesses stated
that he was going home to telephone with regard to tho delivery of a cutting tool which was required before work could
proceed.
. .

~
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[7]

vie,v of the policy of liberal construction of thoworkmen'a
compensation laws, any reasonable doubt as to whether an employee's nct is contemplated by the employment should be resolvod in his favor.
Id. - Proceedings-Rehearing-Second Rehearing.-:-Generally,
if a party docs not prevail on the original he8.ring before the
Industrial Accident Commission and his petition for a rehearing is denied, he may not again petition for a rehearing. He
must seek relief in the courts. (See Lab. Code, § 5950.)
Id.-Proceedings - Rehearing - Second Rehearing.-If one
party prevails on the original hearing before the Industrial
Accident Commission and on rehearing the other party prevails, the first party may petition for rehearing of tho order
made on rehearing because he has for the first time become the
aggrieved party under Lab. Code, § 5900, although it may be
that such petition is not a condition precedent to court review.
Id.-Proceedings-Rehearing-Orders Affected.-An application for rehearing may be made from an order denying relief
under Lab. Code, § 5803, because it' is a final order of the Industrial Accident Commission in which the petitioner is aggrieved.
Id.-Proceedings-Rehearing~Second Rehearing-Newly Discovered Evidenee.-The Industrial Accident Commission may
entertain a petition for rehearing after making an order re-
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opening a case and receiving and considering new evidence,
which petition for rehearing is preflented by the party upon
whose petition the matter was reopened and further. evidence
taken, but comes to the same conclusion as originally reached.
The commission has the power to entertain such a petition because it considered new and additional evidence, the decision
therein is in effect a new decision on new facts, and the party
although failing to prevail on the last occasion as he had on
the first is entitled ,to a reconsideration by the commission of
its opinion on the new evidence.
.

PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Accident Commission denying compensation for death of an employee. Order annulled.
Harold A. McCabe for Petitioners.
Everett A. Corten, J. Gould, Fred G. Goldsworthy, J. L.
Kearney and Herbert S. McCartney for Respondents.

I,

I'.

CARTER, J.-Petitioners, dependents of Claude E. Goodrich, deceased, seek annullment of an order of the Industrial
Accident Commission denying compensation for his death as
the result of an injury which they assert arose out of and
occurred in the course of his employment.
Goodrich was employed on a monthly basis by the H. L.
Whiston Drilling Company, engaged in drilling oil wells, as
drilling superintendent. The commission found that drilling
operations of the employer were being conducted at a place
six-tenths of a mile from the employer's office and one and
seven-tenths miles in the same direction from Goodrich's
home; that Goodrich had no regular hours of duty and was
subject to call at all hours of the day and night; that Goodrich "earried on much of the business of the employer from
said employee's home by mee,ns of the telephone there located, " and he was authorized by the employer in the discretion of the employee to conduct the employer's business at
"any place where the same could be conveniently conducted
dnd was authorized to conduct the business of said employer
from and at either the office of said employer or the home of
said employee among other places"; that there was a telephone in the office; that at the time of the injury to Goodrich
which resulted in his death he "was on his way from said oil
well to his said home, having proceeded past said employer's
office enroute. Said employee's sole purpose in said journey

Aug.l!J4::l]
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was to inform his wife of the probability that he would work
at said oil well throughout the night and it was said employee's intention at said time and place after completing
said errand to return to said oil well."
Goodrich left his home about 7 p. m. the day of the injury
in the car furnished by his employer to go to the above-mentioned place of work on a "fishing" job, stating to his wIfe
that he would possibly be gone all night and that she should
not worry. The work in progress r'equired the removal of a
casing from the well being drilled. A cutting tool for that
purpose had been ordered' between 7 and 8 p.m., and was
supposed to arrive at the well in one to one and one-half hours.
Goodrich had remained at the office of Owens, the man from
whom the tool was ordered, for about one and one-half hours
waitillg for it. When he left for the well it was understood
that Owens would bring the tool there when it arrived.
Shortly before 10 p. m. Goodrich and the workmen under him
were waiting at the well for the tool to arrive. Mr. Gieck,
who was observing the operations, testified that Goodrich said
he wished to go home and inform his wife that he would be
working all night; that he did not want to telephone her as it
would frighten her and awaken his minor child who had had a
tooth pulled. The night was cold and Gieck, haviug a heater
in his car, offered to take Goodrich home. His offer was ac·
cepted and they proceeded directly toward Goodrich's home.
About a half a block therefrom the accident occurred which.
re."lulted in the' death of Goodrich.
'
.
The employer, who was at the well shortly before 10 p.lit.,
testified that Goodrich said to him that he was goillghomc fc,>r
the above-mentioned purpose and expected to be, back by th~
time the tool arrived. To the employer's suggestion that because of thc cold weather GMdrich go to the office' and wa;ii
for the cutting' tool and telephone his wife from there,Good.
rich made no reply. Several of the employees at the w:ell in
Goodrich's charge testified that when he left he said be was
going to telephone to asccrtain why the tool had not arrived.
Goodrich had no regular hours, came nnd went as he pleased
and excrcised considerable discretion in the performance of
his duties. He transacted some of bis employer's business
from bis home and use!l his telephone there for that purpose.
[1] There are mallY act') of an employe~ for his personal .

·' j
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convenience, comfort or welfare, the doing of which do not
necessarily take him out of the course of his employment,
even though done away from the premises of the employer.
(California Cas. Ind. Exch. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 21 Cal.
2d 751 [135 P.2d 158].) Various instances of that character
have been considered by the appellate courts: Drinking wine
because of indispoSition (Elliott v. Industrial Acc. Com., 21
Cal.2d 281 [131 P.2d 521] ; smoking (Whiting-Mead Com. 00.
v. Industrial Ace. Com., 178 Cal. 505 [173 P. 1105, 5 A.L.R.
1518]) ; going to obtain a slicker to wear in the performance
of his duty (Western Pacific R. R. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com.,
193 Cal. 413 [224 P. 754] ) ; going to obtain an overcoat (Leffert, v. Industrial Acc. Com., 219 Cal. 710 [28 P.2d 911]) ;
going into a hallway to obtain fresh air (F. W. Woolworth Co.
v. Industrial Acc. Com., 17 Cal.2d 634 [111 P.2d 313]) ; going to obtain water for a fellow employee who had fainted
(County of Los Angeles v. Industrial Acc. Com., 89 Cal.App.
736 [265 P. 362]) ; returning from purchasing a package of
cigarettes for employee's own use (Western Pipe etc. Co. v.
Industrial Acc. Com., 49 Cal.App.2d 108 [121P.2d 35]);
domestic servant sewing a hem on her dress (Employers' etc.
Corp. v. Industria,l Acc. Com., 37 Cal.App.2d 567 [99 P.2d
1089]).
It has been said that even though an employee may be going to or from his place of employment on a mission personal
to himself if he is also on a substantial mission of his employer which is the major factor in the movement, he may
still be said to be within the C011rse of his employment.
(Western States Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bayside Lumber Co., 182
Cal. 140 [187 P. 735] ; Ocean A. & G. Corp. v. Industrial Acc.
Com., 132 Cal.App. 207 [22 P.2d 537] ; Gagnebin v. Industrial Acc. Com., 140 Cal.App. 80 [34 P.2d 1052] ; Fenton v.
Industrial Acc. Com., 44 Cal.App.2d 379 [112 P.2d 763].)
[2] If it be assumed that the instant case does npt fall
strictly within either one of the foregoing rules, when they
are considered together in light of the facts, established, it is
clear that. the death occurred in and arose out of the course
of employment. Goodrich was on call twenty-four hours a day.
He held a position where he exercised considerable discretion
in the performance of his duties. He conducted some of the
. business of his employer from his home, using the telephone
there' and was reimbursed for long distance calls. Working
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at night on the occasion i~ question,. it was to b~antici~~t~~
that he might return to hm home which 'Was oru! a s~ort ~
tance away to advise his wife that he was going. to wo~k'~
night, although he had previously adviscdher tha.t heprob-,
ably would be so engaged. Althoughhis.empIQyer,sJlggested,~e
telephone his wife from the office,. he dId notfo;bld' Goodnch ,
to return home to speak to his WIfe. Several WItnesses stated
that Goodrich said he was going home to telephone'with r~gard
to the delivery of the cutting tool which wasrequiredhe,fol"~
work could proceed. The making of such a call~oul~ b~in
the line of his duty, and the mere fact that he ~hO'Se hIS home
from' which to call rather than the office was' not' an 'act in
excess of his'discretion in the matter. True, his empl6,yer and.
Gieck testified that Goodrich said he wasreturnhlg ,home to '
advise his wife concerning the time he would'beWaway. 'b'tit
that did not exclude the other purpose 6f telephoning inregard to the, cutting tool. , The trip had dual purPoses.' It cann(rt
be doubted that if under the circumstances he had, been returning home because operations were completed, the injury
would have arisen out of and occurred in the course of employment; (See State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial
Acc,. Com., 89 Cal.App. 197 [264 P. 514] ; California Casualty
lndem. Exch. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 5 Ca1.2d 185 [53 P.2d
758].) It was anticipated that Goodrich would be traveling
~n the streets in an automobile inasmuch as he continuously
ilid that in the course of his duties and the employer furnished hhn a car which he kept at his home. The fact that he
was riding in Gieck's car at· the time is immaterial inasmuch
as his duties included the use of automobile transportation.
We conclude therefore· that the only. reasonable inference
flowing from the evidence is that Goodrich's death aro~e out
of and occurred in the course of his employment. [3] ThlS con..
elusion must follow in light of the rule that any reasonable:
doubt as to whether the act of the employee is contemplated
by the employment should be resolved in favor of the '~m
ployee in view of the policy of liberal construction of the
workmen's compensation laws. (Employers' etc. ·Corp. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 37 Cal.App.2d 567 [99 P.2d 1089].)
Goodrich's dependents filed their' application for compen:"
sation on November 26, 1940. A hellring was thereafter had
resulting on March 4, 1941, in an award to them. On March
22 C.2d-20
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20, ·1941, the employer's insurance carrier petitioned for a
rehearing which was granted on May 6, 1941. Apparently no
other evidence was taken. and a decision on rehearing was
made on May 23, 1941, determining that the death did not
occur in or arise out of the course of employment. On February 13, 1942, applicants filed a petition to reopen the case on
the grounds that the death occurred in the course of employment and to produce new evidence that the decedent had
stated that he was going home to telephone about the cutting
tool. That petition was denied on March 17, 1942. On April 6,
1942, applicants filed a petition for a rehearing based upon
the insuffic;ency of the evidence to support the order, and
newly discovered evidence. On June 5, 1942, the commission
granted that petition aud the matter was set for further hearing. A further hearing was had at which additional evidence
was taken. On JUly 22, 1942, applicants filed a petition for a
further hearing to produce evidence requested by the referee.
It was produced. On August 6, 1942, the commission made
an order reciting that: "Rehearing having been granted
herein, and all parties hnving appeared, and applicant having produced and offered new and additional evidence upon.
material issues herein, and newly-discovered evidence which
could not with reasonable diligence have been produced and
offered upon the original proceedings herein; and ... IT Is
ORDERED that the above-entitled matter be and the same hereby is reopened.
"Applicant having petitioned for further hearing herein,
and having made an offer to prove at said further hearing
the facts set forth in the signed statement of Charles M.
Owens attached to said petition for further hearing as Exhibit •A', and no good cause for said further hearing appearing, . . . IT Is ORDERED that said signed statement of Charles
M. Owens be and the same is hereby admitted in evidence
herein, and said petition for further hearing dated July 22,
194;2, be and the llame is hereby denied; and that the Order
Denying Applicants' Petition to Reopen dated March 17,
1942, be and the same is hereby rescinded, and the Decision
on Rehearing dated May 23, 1941, be and the same is hereby
amended to read as follows." The amendment set forth the
filets heretofore mentioned as found. On August 20, 1942,
applicants petitioned for a rehearing which was denied on
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August 27, 1942. Petition for a review was filed on September
25, 1942.
Respondent commission contends that it. -vyas without j~is
diction to entertain or pass upon the petItlOn for rehearmg
fil?rl. on August 20, 19~2; that the final decision gf tho oo~
mISSIon was made by Its order of Aug-ust 6, 1~4.." and petItioners were required to file their petition for. review in .~e
District Court of .Appeal within :::0 days thereafter, whIch
they failed to do. They petitioned for a rchc!tri~g and. filed
their petition for a revicw within 30 days a!ter' Its den.I~.
[4] Generally, if a party do(>,s not ~rcv~I1 on .the orlgmal
hearing and his petition for a ;ehearmg IS demed, h~ m~y
not again petition for arehearmg .. He must seek relief m
. the courts. (See Labor Code, sec. 5950; Crowe Glass Co; v.
Industrial Ace. Com., 84 Ca1.App. 287 [258 P. 130] ; Campbell, Workmen's Compensation, vol. II, p. 1324; Harla.n v.
Inllustrial Ace. Com., 194 Cal. 352[228 P. G54]; Musta~n v.
Ind1tstrial Ace. Com., 130 Ca1.App. 447 [19 P.2d 1031].)
[5] However, if one party prevails in .the original hearing and
on rehearing the other party prevails, the first par~y may
petition for rehearing .of t~e order made on re~earmg becaul:lc he has for the first tIme become the agg~leved party
under section 5900 of the Labor Code (Dalshe~m v. Industrial Ace. Com., 215 Cal. 107 [8 P.2d 840], dictum; Brunau
v. Industrial Ace. Com., 135 Cal.App. 277 [26 P.2d 672]),
though it may be that such petition is not a condition precedent to court review. (Dalsheim v. Industrial Ace. Com.,
ffi~~)

.

Under the foregoing rules petitioners could have petItioned for a rehearing within twenty days after the decision
of May 23, 1941. However, rather than do that, on March
17 1942 they filed a petition to reopen under' section
"
.
5803 of the Labor Code which provides: "The commlSSIon
has continuing jurisdiction over all its orders, decisions, and,
awards made and entered under the provisions of ,this di:vision. At any time, upon notice an~after an opportunity to
be heard is given to the parties in interest, the· commission
may rescind, alter, or amend any such order, decisio~, or
award, good cause appearing therefor.
,
•• Such power includes the right to review, grant or .regrant, diminish, increase or terminate, within the limits prescribed by this division, any compeJ?sation awarded" upon the
grounds that the disability of the person in whose favor such

..
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award was .made has either recurred, increased, diminished,
or terminated." Their petition was denied, whereupon petitionerspetitioned for a rehearing and it may fairly be said
that such petition was for a rehearing of the denial of th('
petition to reopen inasmuch as in its decision on August 6,
1942, it rescinded that order of denial. [6] Application for rehearing may be made .from an order denying relief under
section 5803 because it is a final order of the commission in .
which the petitioner is aggrieved. (See Ingram v. Department of Industrial Relations, 208 Cal. 633, 637 [284 P. 212].)
After granting the petition of April 6, 1942, new evidence
consisting chiefly of the testimony of the witnesses that Goodrich left with Gieck to telephone with regard to the clitting
tool, was received. Thereafter, the order of August 6, 1942,
was made amending the order of May 23, 1941, to make the
more explicit findings heretofore set forth with respect to
Goodrich's powers and duties, but denying compensation.
It is true that that order of August 6, 1942, purported to
affirm the order of May 23, 1941, but the commission could not in
this manner deprive itself of jurisdiction to entertain a petition
for a rehearing if it had such jurisdiction. [7] The question
is, therefore, whether the commission may entertain a peti.
tion for rehearing after making an order reopening a case
and receiving and considering new evidence, which petition
for rehearing is presented by the party upon whose petition
the matter was reopened and further evidence taken, but
comes to the same conclusion originally reached. It has power
to entertain such a petition because it considered new and
additional evidence, the decision therein is in effect a new
decision on new facts, and the party although failing to prevail on the last occasion as he had on the first is entitled to
a reconsideration by the commission of its opinion on the
new evidence. The very purpose of a rehearing is to have a
reconsideration of a matter which has been theretofore considered only on one occasion. The right to have a reconsideration of the· case where new facts and evidence were produced on the rehearing was not considered in Crowe Glass
Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., s~tpra. That case proceeded upon
the theory that there would be no end to the proceedings
before the commission if successive rehearings could be entertained. Such situation does not exist where a losing party
petitions for and obtains a rehearing on the ground. of newly
discovtlred evidence, which evidence is produced and consid-
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ered by the commission but results in the same conclUsion.
If the losing party again petitions for a rehearing, that is,
a reconsideration of the evidence before the eommission, in
a case where no new evidence is presented, and it is denied, he
cannot again petition for a rehearing, because the commission
in such a case is not requested to reconsider new and dif. ferent evidence. In Harlan v. Industrial Ace. Com., supra,
the court, as pointed out in the dictum in Dalsheim v. Industrial Ace. Com., supra, merely held that whereon granting
a petition for a rehearing the commission reverses itself, the
losing party on rehearing need not petition for a re:hearing
before seeking relief in the courts, but nevertheless, the commission has jurisdiction to entertain a petition for a rehearing .. Beronio v. Industrial Ace. Com., 86 Cal.App..588 [260
P. 1104], involved a second petition for a rehearing on the
ground of newly discovered evidence which had not been
mentioned in the first petition for a rehearing which was
denied, and petitioner had sought relief in the coUrts before
a ruling was made on his second petition for a rehearing, and
hence the court had acquired jurisdiction. Mustain v. Industrial Ace. Com., supra, did not concern a situation in which
a petition for rehearing was filed after a second denial of
compensation on rehearing where new evidence was considered.
The order is annulled.
Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. The decision of the commission
on AUb"llst 6, 1942, which in effect reaffirmed its decision· of
May 23, 1941, was on the rehearing granted petitioners on
June 5, 1942. Section 5950 of the Labor Code provides,
"Within thirty days after the petition for a rehearing is
denied, or, if the petition is granted, within thirty days after
the rendition of the decision on the rehearing, any l;>erson
affected thereby may apply to the. supreme court or to the
district court of appeal of the appellate district in which
he resides, for a writ of review, for the purpose of inquiring
into and determining the lawfulness of the original order, deci.
sion or award, or of the order, decision, or award on rehear.-·
ing." (Italics added.) Under this provision the final decision of
the commission was made on August 6, 1942.. (Ingram v.
Dept. of Industrial Relations, 208 Cal. 633, 636 [284 P. 212] ; .
Harlan v. Industrial Ace. Com., 194 Cal. 352, 365 [228P.
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654] ; Crowe Glass Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 84 Cal.App.
287, 293 [258 P. 130] ; Beronio v. Industrial Ace. Com., 86
Cal.App. 588, 590 [260 P. 1104] ; Mustain v. Industrial Ace.
Com., 130 Cal.App. 447, 448 [19 P.2d 1031].) The petition
for writ of review was not filed within thirty days thereafter
and for that reason should not be considered. (Neal v. Industrial Ace. Com., 36 Cal.App. 40 [171 P. 696J; North Pacific
Steamship Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 34 Cal.App. 488 [168
P. 30].) Since the decision on rehearing made no change in
the award there was no basis for further reconsideration by
the commission. (Cf. Dalsheim v. Industrial Ace. Com., 215
Cal. 107 [8 P.2d 840] ; Brunau v. Industrial Ace. Com., 135
Cal.App. 277 [26 P.2d 672].)
Edmonds, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for arehearina was denied September 1, 1943. Edmonds, J.,and Traynor, J., voted for a rehearing.

fL. A. No. 18637. In Bank. Aug. 3,1943.]

ELDORA HONEA, a Minor, etc., et al., Respondents, v.
CITY DAIRY, INC. (it Corporation), Appellant.
[1] Negligence -

fl..

!I~ I,!'
,!i,'l'

!
!

:l

i'
!

,

,I

Evidence-Res Ipsa Loquitur - Limitations of
Doctrine.-The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable whrre
a thing which causes injury is shown to be under the exclusive
management or control of the defendant or his servants and
the accident is. such' as in the ordinary course of things does
not happen if those who have the management use' proper care;
The doctrine does not apply unless the basic requisites of ex',.elusive control and probability of nE'gligence are proved by
plaintiff.
[2] Id.-Evidence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Oontrol of Instrumentality.-The reason for the g'en('ral requirement of the r('s ipsa
loquitur doctrine that defendant have control of the instrumentality at the time of the injury is to exclude the possibility
[1] Sec 19 Oa1.Jur. 704; 38 Am.Jur. 989.
MeK. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, § 135; [2] Negligence
§ 136; [3] Negligence, §§ 56,138; [4] Negligence, § 123; [5] NcO':
ligence, § 56.
'
c
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that the accident was caused by an intervening act of pIamiiff
or a third person, and this purpose is satisfied if plaintiff shows
that there "as no intervening cause. In an action agaInst 'a
dairy for injuries resulting from the breaking. of a milk bottle
in a customer's hand, plnintiff brought herself within the rule
by, her testimony that the bottles ddivered to her were not
touching at any time when she had them." It would follow,
therefore, that the brok('n bottle was defective when deliverl!d
by the d a i r y . i '"
Id.-Evidence-Res
Ipsa Loquitur-Breaking of'Bottle: Exer[3]
cise of Oare by Vendors.-The· mere breakingofa milk bottle
.in a customer's hand cannot give risr. to the infercneethll.t the
dairy delivering- the bottle wasnrgligent in fnilip,g!to discoycl'
the defect. Whilll the dniry may hav!! had,n.duty;to,mak~,ari,
examination of all bottles, whethcr, ~?~IY.'.ppr~~~se«\1 O1:!:t:e!j"
turned by 'prior customers, it is not reSponslble' 'lor. detects, .
that cannot be found by a rcasonable,prn:cticiibl'ein~~cti()n'.:':;, ,
.

. .

-

,~.l."/·':'d,'~:,.~~ .~\:;. .. ;, . ..• :··1..~l·~ ,i:,~;'!:.,.

[4] Id.-Evidence-Judicial NotiCe ...,..,...Tho ,eour~i~e4~*ofl: takq;,;ju,~'
dicial notice of the technical practices nnd.information avail.."
able' to a bottling industry for discoveringaet~~ti~o. b'ottl~s;.
Nor can the court take judicial notice that ~lli~s' bottics,'afe
not ordinarily damaged or that defects' willn6't (~~ainnriifQ~':"; '.
cur unless the bottll,r is npg'lig'l'nt, for thcsubjcc't is not· a .
'matt!'r of common knowledg'!'.'
"",'" .", .., ,:" ,
[5] Id.-Exercise of Oare by Vendors.-A dairy"was,

not~egH~·.

grllt in delivering a defective bottle to' a customer, ,without.
wrappin!; it, where ,therc -was no basis for an iD.fcrencc'that' ,
tlw dairy knew or should hn:\:c known that the bottle ,was'dc~: ,
fective;
"

J

APPEAL from a j~dgment of the Superior! Court of Los
Angeles County. Peirson M. Hall, Judge.;Rcversed.'.

i

Action' for damages for persollal'mjti~ie~ 'r~~tIn:g f~~m",'
a milk bottle breaking in customer's lland., JUdglnChLfor:.'
pJitintiff reversed.
'
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